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ADDRESS By the DDCI
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CHECKS AND BALANCES IN INTELLIGENCE

This is an unusual opportunity for me, because I'm brand new in the Central Intelligence Agency, and because both the Congress and the President share our view that the atmosphere most conducive to success in intelligence activities is one of reticence and anonymity.

Unfortunately--as is the case with most important endeavors--we are not at liberty to fashion our environment.

And our critics and detractors--as is the case with most critics--are under considerably less restraint. For the most part, they are neither restrained by responsibility, nor circumscribed by knowledge of the facts.

As a result, the Central Intelligence Agency is apt to be blamed or credited, as the case may be, for just about anything that happens anywhere in the world.

Being a home-town boy here, and St. Louis being what it is, I feel that I'm in a safe and congenial environment tonight.

In less friendly environments, however, the CIA has been cited as responsible for a variety of events, ranging from the course of a hurricane over Cuba, and the collapse of a bank in Lebanon, to the difficulties of the French in their former African empire, and the seizure by Ghana of a plane-load of diplomats from Guinea.

It is a general rule in the tradecraft of intelligence that you neither confirm nor deny involvement. From time to time, of course, there are events where it may appear both logical and obvious that CIA is involved, and where it would seem relatively harmless to acknowledge responsibility.

The trouble is that once you begin to confirm or deny, you begin to build a pattern. The time will come when, at some critical juncture, your answer or even your silence is going to give the opposition useful information.

This creates problems for the intelligence service of a democracy. Senator Saltonstall of Massachusetts, in a letter to his constituents earlier this year, commented: "We Americans like to know what's going on, but sometimes in the interest of our own security all the facts cannot be made public. Remember, in a free country, when we tell our own citizens we are also informing our enemies, for they read our newspapers too."

So I am not going to tell you whether CIA did, or did not, send a couple of hurricanes zigzagging back and forth across Cuba in the past three years. It should be obvious, however, that if we have the ability to steer hurricanes, we would have had a word with Flora in 1963, and with Inez this year, to persuade them to stay away from Florida and the Gulf Coast.

There has, however, been one persistent line of criticism, originating to a large degree within our own country, which cannot go unanswered.

That is the charge that the Central Intelligence Agency constitutes an "Invisible Government," making its own rules and policies, and that it is answerable to no one.

This has been refuted by every President since Mr. Truman, and the actual facts are a matter of open record in the laws of our country.

So, while we are supposed to be a silent service, in this particular matter we can and do speak out,
--because we can do so without giving anything away to the enemy;
--because we do not have to violate security to answer;
--and because we are an instrument of a democracy, and the people are entitled to know how they are being served.

We do not make policy; we are an instrument of the policy of our government, and we are bound by it, just as the Armed Forces are.

And we do not carry on operations except at the behest of, and with the approval of, the duly constituted leaders of our government.

Let me dispose first of the charge that the Central Intelligence Agency is under no controls.

The CIA was created by the National Security Act of 1947, which gave the Agency five functions:

- 1) To advise the National Security Council--and of course the President--on intelligence matters relating to national security;
- 2) To co-ordinate all foreign intelligence activities of our government;
- 3) To produce and disseminate finished national intelligence within the government;
- 4) To provide what we call "services of common concern"--functions which serve several, or perhaps all, of the elements in the government, but can best be undertaken centrally; and finally,

5) To perform such other services as the National Security Council may direct.

In the "Cold War" which has existed for even longer than there has been a CIA, we face an enemy adept at conspiracy and subversion, with worldwide clandestine assets, skilled agents, and no compunctions about undermining or overthrowing any government which resists the spread of Communism.

There are apt to be occasions when it will be important for the United States, in order to counter these Communist efforts, to have its own capability to respond by covert or clandestine operations. This is not necessarily because the United States would be ashamed of either the objectives or the methods. It is primarily because it sometimes takes clandestine methods to beat clandestine methods--just as a killer submarine is one of the best weapons to use against another submarine.

This is the shadowy, twilight zone of government operations that Congress had in mind when it directed the CIA to perform "such other services" as the National Security Council might direct.

Our critics would have you believe that ever since Congress gave CIA this authority in 1947, we have done as we pleased, without regard to official policies or objectives of the United States government, and sometimes in diametric opposition to those policies.

Whenever the CIA carries out a covert operation overseas, it is with the prior approval of an Executive Committee of the National Security Council. This committee has had various names and various incarnations through the years, but essentially it is chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, representing the President.

He meets once a week--or more often if necessary--with the Director of Central Intelligence and representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense--normally the Under Secretaries or Deputy Under Secretaries of those two departments.

Each and every operation which the Agency is going to conduct overseas, whether it is political, psychological, economic, or even paramilitary, is presented to this committee. It either wins the approval of the committee, or it does not take place.

When covert operations are approved in advance by representatives of the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense, it is obvious that these operations are not going to be contrary to--or outside of--the guidelines established by United States Government policy.

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In a military theater of operations, our people in effect become a service component under the control of the Theater Commander.

Our undertakings must also have the approval of the Bureau of the Budget. Specific individuals of that Bureau have been given full clearance to inquire into all of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in detail---- and believe me, they make full use of that authority.

In addition to such prior approvals, there are other elements of the executive branch which have the same full clearance to monitor our continuing operations, and conduct post-mortems on those which have been completed.

Some of these have been ad hoc groups--the Clark Committee and the Doolittle Committee, for instance; Hoover Commission task forces; and several special investigating bodies for specific purposes.

On a permanent basis, all of the intelligence operations of the US Government are under the continuing scrutiny of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. This Board was formed in January, 1956, under the chairmanship of Dr. James Killian of M.I.T., and is now headed by one of our prominent fellow townsmen, Mr. Clark Clifford. It is a very knowledgeable assemblage of distinguished private citizens appointed by and reporting to the President. It meets for two or three days every six weeks to examine--in depth and in detail--the work and the progress of the entire US intelligence program.

The present Board under Mr. Clifford includes --former high government officials such as Ambassador Robert Murphy, former Under Secretary of State; Mr. Frank Pace, Jr., former Secretary of the Army and Director of the Budget; Mr. Gordon Gray, who was President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs; --former military men, General Maxwell Taylor and Admiral John Sides;

--men from the academic world like Professor William Langer of Harvard; and
--prominent leaders in business and technology, such as Dr. William O. Baker of Bell Telephone Laboratories; Dr. Edwin Land, head of Polaroid; and Mr. Augustus Long, former board chairman of Texaco.

Between regular meetings, these men also serve on subcommittees to carry on continuing investigations of our successes and failures in intelligence.

We are not only under effective control by the Executive Branch---whatever you may have read to the contrary, we are also under the continuing scrutiny of the Legislative Branch.

Ever since CIA was first established, the Director of Central Intelligence has been authorized by the President, and in fact instructed, to make complete disclosure of CIA activities to special subcommittees in both the Senate and the House of Representatives.

The Congress has created very select subcommittees of the Armed Services Committees in both the House and Senate to hear these reports. Incidentally, another prominent St. Louisan, Senator Symington, is a member of the special subcommittee in the Senate.

Also, as you may have surmised from my reference to the Bureau of the Budget, our operations sometimes require some money. Our headquarters are in Langley, Virginia, not at Fort Knox, and our appropriations have to come from Congress, like those of all government agencies.

We do not want to hand out free information to the opposition, so our funds are lumped in--we hope inconspicuously--with appropriations for other agencies. They are discussed in full, however, with special subcommittees of Senate and House Appropriations. These officials are also authorized complete access to all of our operations.

After they have scrutinized and passed on our requirements, they then see to it that my salary is not inadvertently eliminated by somebody who may believe he is only reducing the Federal Government's consumption of paper clips or carpeting.

Some of the confusion over CIA's relations with Congress arises from the fact that these special subcommittees, and only these--about 25 legislators in all--are authorized to inquire in detail into all of our activities and operations.

We will, of course, ^{provide sub} brief any congressional committee ^{in their area of interest} having a jurisdictional interest on our substantive intelligence from all over the world. In 1965, for instance, there were about 20 such committee hearings--and some of them ran as long as three full days. We also brief individual congressmen frequently at their request.

But discussion of CIA activities, methods, and sources is another matter.

It involves the lives of people who work with us, and the efficacy of our methods. National Security Council directives specify that these matters will be discussed only with the special subcommittees designated for these purposes. This is not arbitrary or bureaucratic; it is simply recognition that the risk of inadvertent disclosure rises with the number of people who have access to sensitive information of this type.

Where disclosure is authorized, it is complete. In 1965, for instance, in addition to those 20 hearings on substantive intelligence, the Director or his senior aides met a total of 34 times with the special subcommittees to keep them informed on the operations of Central Intelligence.

So much, then, for the charge that CIA is under no controls and that nobody in Washington is told what CIA is doing.

As for the charge that CIA makes policy, let me reiterate that intelligence is one of the ingredients of policy-making, but does not formulate it.

We support the people who actually make the decisions. Our role is to supply the information, the evaluation, and the estimates which they need to arrive at an informed decision.

Intelligence, you know, is really an everyday business, not confined to governments. When Mother listens to the weather forecast and then makes Junior wear his rubbers or galoshes to school, she is using an intelligence estimate to arrive at a policy decision.

The Cardinals and Charlie Winner may think that they are going over the scouting reports in preparation for next Sunday's game at Dallas. In our language, they are examining current intelligence on the capabilities and intentions of the enemy, in order to formulate contingency plans for the outbreak of hostilities.

Now, the weather bureau will talk in terms of the likelihood--the probability--of rain or snow. It leaves the decision on rubbers or galoshes up to Mother.

Similarly, that scouting report will deal with possible weaknesses or vulnerabilities of the Dallas Cowboys, and warn about the nature of their principal threats. The decision on how the Cardinals are going to cash in on the information is left up to the coach.

It is the same in government, and intelligence.

It is fashionable, when we speak of our national strategy, to refer to "options," or "alternatives." This is the "in" way of saying that you should never paint yourself into a corner. It means that whenever the President is called upon to make a policy decision, he must always have two or more realistic choices.

The role of intelligence is to provide the President and his advisers with factual, and above all objective, information which in the first place determines whether the options are, in fact, realistic, and then enables the policymaker to compare his options and make an informed choice.

If the organization which gathers the information becomes an advocate of one particular option--one proposed course of action--then the intelligence which it provides is necessarily suspect. It is no longer acceptable per se as objective. Whether or not the depth of partisan advocacy consciously or unconsciously builds a self-serving bias into the intelligence reporting, the decision makers must take this possibility into account.

That is the reason why CIA is not engaged in policy formulation, would not want to be, and would not be allowed to be.

Information is our business--the collection, analysis, and evaluation of information; as accurate, and as comprehensive, and above all as objective as possible.

If we become advocates of policy, we lose our credibility, which is our most useful asset in serving the government.

If the policy makers permit us to take part in policy formulation, they must start by discounting the objectivity of the intelligence we furnish them. Any advocate of an alternative course of action can provide information to support his

proposals, but because he is an advocate, the information becomes a tendentious argument, not an objective appreciation of the facts and the probable consequences.

By the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence is the principal intelligence adviser of the President. He reports to the National Security Council, which in effect means that he reports to the President. He is not beholden to any other department of the Government. Even in the National Security Council, he is an adviser, not a member.

In the minds of the Congress, this was the only sensible way to establish the CIA and the position of Director. It is the only arrangement which gives the President, who must make the ultimate decisions, an adviser and a source of information completely divorced from the competing and sometimes parochial views of the advocates of alternate choices.

This principle does not require the checks and balances that I have listed which monitor the covert operations of the CIA, because it is a principle which has been welcomed and implemented by every man who has held the office of Director of Central Intelligence.

This has been attested to in public by every President, and by officers at the cabinet level who would be the first to complain if it were not so.

There is one concept which operates as a control mechanism in this respect, and that is the concept of the intelligence community.

You may never have read of the intelligence community-- it doesn't fit into a headline as easily as CIA, and it doesn't have the same juicy appeal to the information media. If there were no intelligence community, however, the CIA might never have been created to coordinate its work.

Obviously, the function of intelligence in the United States Government did not begin with the Office of Strategic Services in World War II. Intelligence is one of the oldest professions, dating back at least to Noah and the airhorne reconnaissance mission he launched from the Ark. In our own country, George Washington found spies to be not only necessary but exceptionally useful during the Revolutionary War.

Down through the years, there have been intelligence components in the Navy, the Army, the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, even in such comparatively

prosaic offices as the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Commerce.

These intelligence agencies, however, existed primarily to serve the needs of their particular departments. As a result, there has been a natural tendency for their interests and their competencies to be somewhat parochial. Some departmental intelligence was developed by diplomats or economists who might be unfamiliar with weapons. Other departmental intelligence may have been derived, through military activities, from persons who were more conversant with order of battle or with weapons systems than they were with the political or economic developments. But this specialization was not the main weakness.

The significant failing of such an apparatus lay in the possibility that one of the intelligence components might--by unilateral decision--consider a given piece of information too marginal, too unimportant, to be passed along to the decision makers, or even laterally to the other intelligence components.

One of the lessons we learned from Pearl Harbor was that information must not only be exchanged and

coordinated among all of these disparate intelligence elements: there must also be a clear responsibility for bringing that intelligence to the attention of all of the men in our government who need to know it.

As a result, the men who make the decisions for our national government today want what we call national intelligence. This is the agreed synthesis of all the intelligence available to the government from all possible sources, analyzed against all of expertise and all of the background information we can bring to bear.

The National Security Act of 1947, which created the Central Intelligence Agency, did not put the State Department, or the armed services, or the commercial and agricultural attaches, out of the intelligence business. Instead, it rounded up all of the intelligence assets available to the government, and established the Central Intelligence Agency to coordinate the work of this intelligence community.

Mr. Helms has the title of Director of Central Intelligence, not only Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He is the principal intelligence officer of the Government, and when he reports to the President, or the National Security Council, he is delivering the intelligence developed by all of the assets of the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, Navy,

Army and Air Force intelligence, and the intelligence components of the Department of State, the FBI, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

This is what we mean by the intelligence community. When finished national intelligence goes forward, it is the agreed and considered evaluation by all of these components-- or at least if there has been disagreement, the dissenting views are set forth in footnotes for the guidance of the policy-maker.

I should add that except for the representatives of CIA, the members of this community come from departments and agencies which have a legitimate role in policy formulation. When they act as intelligence community, however, they are under strict injunction to come up with an objective and impartial appreciation of the intelligence picture, the interpretation of its significance, and the estimate of possible future developments.

The intelligence community includes enough of these non-CIA elements so that, in any disagreement, it is virtually certain to have representatives from agencies on opposite sides of the fence. This in turn provides the safety mechanism

that I mentioned. With the opposing sides represented, it is inconceivable that there would not be loud complaints if the finished national intelligence were not completely objective. It is a viable dialogue that provides the same sorts of checks and balances that our own "Dialogue of Democracy" does, to borrow a phrase from Emmet Hughes.

Finally, if I may, I want to devote a few moments to the types of people who work for the CIA.

The fact of the matter is that James Bond and his colleagues of the spy movies and novels never worked there.

A commentary in the London Economist last month, discussing the British intelligence service, makes my point pretty well with this summary: "Modern intelligence has to do with the painstaking collection and analysis of fact, the exercise of judgment, and clear and quick presentation. It is not simply what serious journalists would always produce if they had time; it is something more rigorous, continuous, and above all operational--that is to say, related to something that somebody wants to do or may be forced to do."

Our appetite for information is catholic and enormous. Our basic background information on foreign countries, compiled in what we call the National Intelligence Surveys, already adds up to more than 10 times the size of the Encyclopedia Britannica.

Much of this is hardly secret, covering such prosaic matters as economic statistics, legal codes, sociological conditions, and transport facilities. The information has to be on hand against the contingency that Country X, seemingly remote and of little current concern to our national security, may some day erupt onto our list of critical situations. Against that day, we must have not only the information, but the experienced and knowledgeable experts to interpret and apply it.

Take French Somaliland. After the recent riots there, President De Gaulle announced that French Somaliland should have the right to decide between remaining under French rule, or becoming independent. Is this of no concern to us? Ethiopia and the Republic of Somalia have each announced that if France sets its Somalis free, either Ethiopia will seize the

area to keep it out of Somali hands, or vice versa. Now, the United States has a very close relationship with Ethiopia, and the Soviet Union trains, equips, and advises the Somali armed forces. If there is, then, even the remotest possibility of a direct confrontation in this area between the United States and the Soviet Union, it behooves us to know today, not at some time in the future, such matters as harbor facilities in Djibouti, the terrain in the hinterland, the capacity of the railroad, and the composition of the population.

The result is that the CIA employee is a much more academic man than the public realizes. We may have a few men with the debonair aplomb of Napoleon Solo, but we have more than 800 senior professionals with 20 years or more of intelligence background. Three quarters of our officers speak at least one foreign language. About 15 percent have graduate degrees. Six out of every 10 of the analysts who have direct responsibility at headquarters for analysis of a foreign area had lived, worked, or traveled abroad in that area even before they came to CIA.

When you combine all of the years required for graduate study, foreign experience, and then add 10 to 15 years of intelligence work, it adds up to an impressive depth of knowledge, competence, and expertise at the service of our government.

We could easily and adequately staff the faculty of a university with our experts, and in a way, we do. Many of those who leave us join university faculties, and others take leaves of absence to teach, and renew their contacts with the academic world.

I have discussed with you how the Central Intelligence Agency serves the government, how it is controlled, and briefly, what manner of man works there. I have left to the end one final question: "Why?"

For the answer, let me cite a couple of outside witnesses:

Secretary of State Rusk last December told a public meeting of the White House Conference on International Cooperation:

"I would emphasize to you that CIA is not engaged in activities not known to the senior policy officers of the Government. But you should also bear in mind that beneath the level of public discussion, there is a tough struggle going on in the

back alleys all over the world. It is a tough one, it's unpleasant, and no one likes it, but that is not a field which can be left entirely to the other side. And so, once in a while, some disagreeable things happen, and I can tell you that there is a good deal of gallantry and a high degree of competence in those who have to help us deal with that part of the struggle for freedom."

In April, 1965, President Johnson put it this way: "We have committed our lives, our property, our resources and our sacred honor to the freedom and peace of other men, indeed, to the freedom and peace of all mankind. We would dishonor that commitment, we would disgrace all the sacrifices Americans have made, if we were not every hour of every day vigilant against every threat to peace and freedom. That is why we have the Central Intelligence Agency."

I would add to this only my strong personal view that-- in this day and age--if we did not already have a CIA, we would certainly have to invent something very like it, or perish as a nation in the face of an international conspiracy that has only one objective--the destruction of our society--and no scruples whatsoever as to how best to achieve it.